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In this article on the Inland Revenue, John Booth highlights 
problems which he considers can be attributed to a lack of 
statutory accountability for the Revenue Service to Parliament.
T he authority and direction over the Inland Revenue by HM Treasury was discussed by the writer in European Financial Services Law ((1999) 6 EFSL 1) who concluded 
that there was inadequate accountability to Parliament, by the 
Treasury, for the Revenue and that this should be re-defined by 
statute.
This article shows that similar failures of statutory 
accountability exist for the Revenue to Parliament, and that, 
additionally, the Revenue did not exercise the statutory 'care' in 
its management of inland revenues, (Inland Revenue Board Act 
1849, s. 1) until 'caring for staff was introduced in 1991 (Cmnd 
2086 at 1 3). The present failings of the Revenue over the 
introduction and administration of the self-assessing programme 
are shown to be from the consequences of many years of 
administrative failures for which no annual procedure of 
accountability to the House of Commons exists.
SELF ASSESSMENT: THE DELUSION
The delusion is from the assumption that self assessing was 
derived from the Inland Revenue Development Plan (IR, 
January 1993), whereas its origins were in the administrative 
failures recorded in the reports on the Revenue by House of 
Commons committees from 1968 to 1969. Seventeen reports of 
the Estimates Committee (1968-69 HC 101 I - xvii) noted 
then the serious situation for the Department, but that it was:
' ... more serious for the public [where] errors and delays [caused] 
widespread distress and hardship with no legal riaht of redress. '
It was a department in turmoil from impossible budgetary- 
demands, staff resignations, avalanches of paper, and the 
inspectorate 'in splendid isolation', with the administration at 
breaking point. Eleven subsequent House of Commons reports 
from 1979-80 to 1992-1993 revealed that the crisis was never 
resolved (see the writer's review of this period in Stand and
Deliver! The Inland Revenue and Non-Statutory Taxation, ISBN 1 872 
879 694, chap. I and II), and continues to date.
That period of crisis peaked in October 198S, when 
unanswered letters over 14 days old had reached in excess of 6 
million, over 240 inspectors had resigned in that year, and staff 
complement had been reduced by some 15,000, as the following 
graphs show:
Fig I Unworked Revenue mail. October 1981 = 100(%). 
Ref: from 1985-86 HC 165-i, Memo: 1.2; 2.3 
1986-87 HC357-i. p.6
380
340
300
260
220
180
140
Year 1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 87 88 1989
Fig II Inspector of Taxes resignation: Actual. 
Ref: from 1988-89 HC 155, Appendix 1, An
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
Year 1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 87 88 1989
Amicus Curiae Issue 22 November 1999
The real reason for self-assessing was identified when the
o
Committee of Public Accounts was told that the cause of the 
Revenue's crisis stemmed from the government's policy to 
reduce the size of the Civil Service and that the Revenue staff 
would be reduced by 25 per cent (1984-85 HC 315 - iii, q. 
45). The consequences are shown in Fig. Ill below.
The origin tor this decision is that the then Prime Minister 
received a report from an 'Efficiency Unit' on 'Improving 
Management in Government', in 1988, about which the then 
Cabinet Secretary replied to a question from a Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee that it was:
'... not a White Paper to which the Government subscribed or takes 
responsibility [for] ... ' (1987-88 HC 370 - I, q. 49)
For the Revenue the answer would be to replace staff with 
computers and, by removing the management authority for an 
inspector to 'assess the tax' (Taxes Management Act 1970 ('TMA 
1970'), s. 8), and making taxpayers liable to assess themselves to 
tax (Finance Act 1994, s. 179) the management crisis of reduced 
staff, resignations and paper mountains would be resolved. 
However it was a Revenue management provision; it was not in 
a budget statement, or the Finance Bill of 1994, but inserted in 
Committee from Revenue pressure and, although passed in the 
Finance Act 1994, had not received the scrutiny of the House of 
Commons.
Fig III Revenue Staff in post (X = 1000)
Ref: from 1987-88 Cm 529, p.6; 1992 Cm 2086. p.7
Year 1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 1989
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In 1994, Sue Green, in a paper researched for the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, summarised the intended self assessing 
as 'incompatible with the present complex and illogical UK tax 
system' (Compliance Costs and Direct Taxation, ICA (1994) at 1).
SELF ASSESSMENT: THE INCOMPATIBILITY
A consequence ol this incompatibility was identified in 1999 
to a Treasury Committee (HC 199, App.l) when the Revenue 
reported that some '870,000 misleading Statements of Account' 
were issued, only to be 'exacerbated by a confusing explanatory 
letter'. It was an example of the incompatibility ot computer- 
controlled programming of one of the most complex and 
illogical tax systems, bringing consequential administrative 
chaos. Green had warned that the legislative process was in need 
ot urgent review, that taxpayers and advisers would have the 
greatest difficulty in understanding selt assessing and that 'we 
cannot afford to ignore the potential chaos that may result'.
By 1995 the Financial Times had reported Revenue errors 
costing £350m and the Chartered Institute of Taxation was 
quoted as saying that:
'Taxpayers did not ask for a change and if it does not come in 
properly people will feel aggrieved. '
The 870,000 misleading statements confirm the 
administrative failures over which self-assessed taxpayers and 
their advisers are now justifiably aggrieved. All of which 
confirms Green's prescience that self assessing really is 
incompatible with the system of UK taxation. But the causes lie 
deep within the department's historic failings, added to by a 
government's denigration of civil servants from 1979, and 
reducing staffing complements.
THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM
Following criticisms of inadequate accountability by the Inland 
Revenue, the Treasury Committee (HC 199, op. cit.) said that:
'We have become convinced of the needjor regular and systematic 
scrutiny of the Inland Revenue and the tax system by a departmental 
committee. '
Such a regular and permanent committee is long overdue, as 
previous examinations by Estimates, and Appropriation 
Committees, the Public Accounts Committee, and Treasury and 
Civil Service Committees, in 1937, 1961, 
1981, 1986 and now 1999, have 
consistently recommended. Finally the 
government's response to the Sixth 
Special Report is encouraging in that it 
was:
'... happv to co-operate fully with any 
jurther inquiries into the Inland Revenue and 
the tax system. ' (1998-99 HC 746 at iii)
In 1971 a similar recommendation 
from the Select Committee on Procedure 
had been blocked by the then Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury (1970-71 HC 
276, XXII, 655, para. 43(4)). However, 
in 1999, the Paymaster General dismissed 
the proposal tor a Royal Commission, 
claiming that scrutiny of the tax system
was provided in the Finance Bill, ignoring that the self assessing 
proposals had never appeared in a Finance Bill, and stating that:
T cannot immediately see the attraction of having a Royal 
commission. It is the job of governments to do this and be held to 
account for it.' (HC 199 q. 392)
This was despite the submission by the Chartered Institute of 
Taxation, and others, that 'the time is ripe tor a Royal 
Commission on Taxation' in support of its Memorandum to the 
Treasury Committee (HC 199, op cit p.26). Later evidence is 
quoted to show that both the Treasury and the Revenue had 
plotted to pre-empt the 1951 Royal Commission, with a 
department report on taxation. It is therefore quite vital that 
commissions on taxation should be open and quite independent 
of government, the Treasury and the Inland Revenue.
o J
There is still the question of accountability in regard to the 
use of contracted-out computer services and self assessing. In 
1987 the Committee of Public Accounts and the National Audit
Projected
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Office had raised the question of the control of Information 
Technology in the Revenue (HC 132 and 262), which the 
Revenue claimed to be under the Taxes Management Act 1970, 
s. 1 and the Revenue Regulation Act 1890, s. 1. However, in 1992 
the oversight was questioned by the Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Commissioner (the Ombudsman) (HC 158, q. 
40 47), when it was denied that there was any detraction from 
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, who is excluded from 
investigating commercial transactions. The Revenue claimed in 
a letter of 24 September 1993 that:
.. .access provision would be included in [the] contract ..."
A press release added that the procurement would be as for 
Revenue employees under the unauthorised disclosures of 
taxpayer personal information (23 November 1993), under the 
Finance Act 1989, s. 182. However the Board was disingenuous
' O
in these responses because s. 182 is in consequence of the 
Official Secrets Act Order (SI 1990/199), with prosecution only 
initiated by the Board (1990/199)or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. This means that an investigation of procurement 
contracts, by the Ombudsman, is circumvented, and this 
oversight has not been resolved.
o
A Deputy Chairman of the Board in a speech on 18 May 1993 
to the Tax Faculty of the ICA acknowledged the question of 
accountability by the Board to the Public Accounts Committee. 
In this speech it was stated that the new Inland Revenue was 
'based on the sound foundations built by the people of 
yesterday'.
But how sound are these foundations?
SOUND FOUNDATIONS WITHOUT 
CODIFICATION?
From 1849 the Revenue has mishandled its administration. 
Although created by the Revenue Board Act of February 1849, 
without statutory provision for any reports to be made, a 
Treasury Minute had requested 'a Report to My Lords from time 
to time' (PRO T 29/529, 12 January 1849). This minute was 
ignored. A second direction was issued in 1856 for the 'calendar 
year ending on the 31 December', which admonished the 
Board, regretting that:
' ... such a custom has not been called into existence at an earlier 
period ...' (PRO T 22/36, 27 November 1856)
The first Report, without apology or reason, was made on 16 
February 1857, for the 'year ended 31 March 1856' (1857 Sess 
1 [2199], IV, 670) which ignored the requested calendar year, 
causing confusion in later reports between 5 April and 31 
December, However, the blatant administrative blunder is that 
no reports were ever made, or exist, for the period February 
1849 to 31 March 1855. During this time a Chancellor 
projected the cessation of income tax (Taxes Act 1853, s. 1), and 
the Crimean War began, which forced the continuation of 
income tax. No Treasury or Revenue reports exist for either of 
these momentous events, or of the funds raised to prosecute the 
war.
A Select Committee reported the Minutes of Evidence on his 
first Report to the House in 1862 (HC 370 VII, 131) but 
Disraeli rejected any discussion. Subsequent challenges, in the 
House, by Select Committee Members, in regard to criticisms of 
the Revenue raised in the Report were also dismissed by Disraeli
as an 'inconvenience inherent in the nature of the tax' (165 
Hansard 3s 1862 cols. 122 7). It was of course nothing of the 
sort as it could have been amended by legislation, for which the 
Chancellor (Disraeli) had responsibility.
These Minutes recorded the unfavourable feeling of the 
public towards the Inland Revenue and the 'opinion that this 
feeling is well-founded' which was later endorsed in Green's
o
Report in 1994.
In 1897 the Committee of Public Accounts (HC 196, VIII, 5) 
was dissatisfied with the Revenue's accounts, and the 1906 Select 
Committee (HC 365-IND, IX, 290) called for a codification of 
tax laws. Finally, the 1920 Royal Commission (Cmnd 615) called 
for a codification of all decisions of tax principles and 
interpretation, effectively the abolition of the existing tax 
legislation. But it was the prescience of the then Winston 
Churchill, in 1927, as Chancellor, who wrote the Minute which 
created the Income Tax Codification Committee, meeting all of 
the recommendations of the 1920 Royal Commission.
After nine years of dogged determination this Committee
J OO
produced the impossible in 1936, a Report (Cmnd 5131) and a 
Finance Bill (Cmnd 5132). The Report was devastating. It 
referred to the 'chaotic condition' of existing legislation, its 
'haphazard process of amendment' as an 'incoherent 
accumulation' and recommended total 're-codification at short 
intervals to prevent a relapse into the existing state of 
confusion'. It remains a complete rebuttal of any suggestion of 
the 'sound foundations' too easily claimed in 1994. No 
codification took place, and the political prevarication in 
response to the nine questions raised in the House between 
1935-36 and 1938-39 (see Stand and Deliver!, op cit at p.l) 
remains incomprehensible. However, it was revealed in 1955 by 
the last Royal Commission (Cmnd 9474, para. 1077-80) that 
the opposition had come from the Revenue on the grounds of 
it not being 'a viable instrument'. Later, in 1993, a Secret 
Revenue file on the 1927 Committee, marked 'closed to year 
2006', was discovered (PRO IR 40/3654, T 1135/13/30), 
which may yet reveal reasons for the administrative opposition 
to successive tax reforming reports. The Commission paid 
tribute to the 'very highly qualified Committee which had 
prepared a draft codifying Bill'. All of which confirms that, in 
1955, both tax legislation and its administration had been 
fundamentally flawed from their origins.
CARE, MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING
In 1992, under pressure from White Papers on the citizen's 
charter and Competing for Quality, the Revenue, in its Annual 
Report, decided to improve the 'customer services, compliance 
and cost efficiency', but also, to impress its staff as a 'good 
employer', added that 'caring for Staff has an equal priority' 
(Cmnd 2086 at 1, 3). This statement re-introduced 'caring' 
because, although provided for in the Board Act 1849 as 'Care 
and Management', it had never been referred to again. Indeed, 
committees and commissions had noted the efficiency of 
Revenue staff, but the recommended salary considerations had 
never been met.
In 1999 the Treasury committee considered 'Care for staff 
and noted the need for a well-managed and motivated staff 
confident in the aims and objectives of the Department. But it 
also noted a 1998 Staff Survey, which suggested that: 11
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' ... the Revenue is still facing many of the same issues it identified 
in 1992 ... '
Also, in measuring sickness absences as an indicator of staff 
problems, showed that this had risen from 9.6 days per calendar 
year per staff member in 1994 to 11.7 in 1997 (HC 199 para. 
21). This endorsed the view of the 28 adverse Reports on the 
Revenue from 1968 to 1993 of a permanently disillusioned staff 
of low morale. In 1994 the Revenue admitted that 'Morale is 
not as good as it has been' (HC 532 - i, q. 103). In 1985 it was 
shown to have been bad, but endorses an inspector's view in 
1999 that 'Morale is [still] a very serious issue' (private source).
The story is bleak in regard to the inspectorate. In 1961 an 
Estimates Committee reported the inspectorate as 300 below its 
authorised strength (HC 245, VI, 1). In 1968 the graduate 
recruitment showed a wastage of 50 per cent (HC 101   vii,
XII, 09, and HC 474, XIII), which has never been stopped. In 
1986 a Treasury and Civil Service committee reported that 
trained inspector resignations were 1.8 per cent in 1982 83 
and 7.1 per cent in 1985-86 (see Fig. II).
The rigorous training programme for inspectors had some 
shortcomings. In 1977 RT Bartlett had written in
O
complimentary terms of the programme for inspectors ('Inland 
Revenue Training for the Inspectorate', [1978] BTR 289). 
However Bartlett noted:
' ... the almost total exclusion from the training of people who are 
not in the Revenue sen-ice'.
An introspection not conducive to a broad consideration of 
affairs. Additionally the three-year course required six to seven 
years to complete for some 40 per cent of trainees. No other 
independent review is noted, and in 1992 the Revenue 
proposed that all staff would be in a single staff group (Cm 
2086). There was no reference as to how the different grades in 
the single group would be trained in future, but the abolition of 
the statutory duties of the inspector (Finance Act 1994, s. 179) is 
noted as a management policy.
Elitism has therefore been removed from the inspectorate 
but, in view of the self-assessing disasters, have the trained skills 
gone? The latest Committee reports do not indicate that new 
computer training programmed has been linked with the new 
management changes to the increasing complexity of tax 
legislation. Neither has elitism gone from the Board.
The fault line in regard to the Board still stems from the 
criticisms in the Fulton Report (1968, Cmnd 3638) of the 
administrative service with 'too few skilled managers'. By 1994 
it was noted that the 'cult of the generalist' was 'obsolete' and 
that the senior civil service was too insular; it mirrored the 
findings of the 1968-69 Estimates Sub-Committee (HC 101,
XIII, 517).
In 1968 the Sub-Committee was not impressed that the Chief 
Inspector of Taxes was (and is still) not a member of the Board, 
that the Board only met informally, conducting business orally 
and that the members had no formal training in taxation. In 
1992 two non-revenue members were invited onto the Board in 
a non-executive capacity (Cm 2086) there was no public 
advertisement for the posts and another management tier was 
interposed between the Board, heads of department, staff and 
the public, ensuring the exclusivity of the former. Finally, in 
1994, a Support division was created (Inland Revenue letter, 15
February 1994), which replied to all questions directed at the 
Board, now in glorious isolation.
REFORMS AND OBSTRUCTIONS
Whilst the Board is charged that taxes shall be under the 'care 
and management of the commissioners' (TMA 1970, s. 1), the 
consequences of legislative demands and administrative failures 
precipitated the rush to self assessment, with the acceptance 
that the statutory responsibility of 'collection and management 
of inland revenue' (IRRA 1890, s. 1) was unattainable. The 28 
quoted adverse reports on the Revenue from 1968-69, under 
such headings as 'Tax Office Delays', 'Arrears of Work', 
'Manpower Losses' and 'Getting tax right first time', all reflect 
the Revenue's inability to recruit, train and retain sufficient staff 
to meet their statutory requirement to 'collect and manage 
inland revenue' with a permanently undermanned and under- 
trained staff.
In 1936 the failure to meet the requirement of the Report of 
the Codification Committee for greater simplicity, and to codify 
precedents, has permanently scarred all subsequent attempts at 
reform. The 1996 attempt to 'Re-write tax legislation in plain 
English' (press release, 2 July 1996) cannot succeed because, as 
Sir John Donaldson, MR explained in 1984, that:
'It is for Parliament to make the laws andjor the courts to tell the 
nation, including members of both Houses of Parlibment, what those 
laws mean.' (R v HM Treasury ex p. Smedley [1984] 1 All ER 589 
at 593)
Legislation cannot therefore be 're-written' or 're-drafted', 
and it ill behoves the Revenue to suggest that it can. The 
Revenue do introduce their own interpretations of tax law 
through pamphlets and 'Tax Bulletins', but all are inadmissible 
before the courts and reflect the Revenue's interests, when the 
taxpayer may defend his/her own interests through independent 
advisers.
More serious however is when the Treasury and the Revenue 
seek to influence reforming proposals. In 1949 a top secret 
'Exercise Diogenes' was set up to change taxing policies. It was 
to be 'kept within a small circle' as the exercise was 'without 
Ministerial direction' (PRO IR 40/12845, BC(D)(49) 1, 22 July 
1949). In 1950 this research re-emerged to pre-empt the 195 1 
Royal Commission on Taxation by suggesting practicable 
schemes:
' ... or you leave thejield open to the cranks and ignoramuses.'
When these schemes were discovered by the Chancellor the 
Revenue were told that:
7 do not think they should put forward a scheme at all.'
In 1978 the Meade Report suffered from a similar isolating 
treatment despite the high ethical objective to: 'command a wide 
consensus of political approval' in order to set 'an acceptable 
floor to the standard of living of all citizens' (The Structure and 
Reform of direct Taxation', IPS 91978)) It also considered the 
'harmonisation of taxation policies with other EEC countries'. 
No other budget or commission has set such a high political 
standard, but the Revenue's only response was that:
'The pursuit of equity and simplicity usually leads in opposite 
directions. Where equity almost always prevails   at the cost of 
simplicity.' (1978 Cmd 7473, Ch.V)
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It was the expected negative response from a department set 
on isolating 'cranks and ignoramuses'.
Finally, in regard to the tax re-write proposals, the Chartered 
Institute of Taxation's memorandum to the 1999 Treasury 
Committee noted that the terms of reference precluded any 
change in the law, was 'forced to re-incorporate out-dated 
concepts' and that 'an opportunity [was] being lost to consider 
amendments of substance which would simplify the tax system'. 
(HC 199. Memorandum para. 5.2)
But, as the Revenue had deftly dealt with the reforming
' J o
opportunities in 1936 and 1978, the possibilities of reform and 
comprehensible tax legislation are as remote as ever.
COMPLAINTS
The Revenue's response to proved complaints is a minimum 
acceptance of responsibility and reluctance, despite the 
Taxpayer's Charters and the Codes of Practice, Mistakes by the 
Inland Revenue, to compensate for the cost of a taxpayer's 
compliance with the laws.
Historically the Revenue and the governments have rejected 
any responsibility for tax legislation. However, Members' 
complaints in the House, from the first Report by the Revenue, 
brought a reply from Gladstone that:
'The amounts of tax payable is intrusted to the Commissioners, and 
... there is no appeal.' (165 Hansard 3s 1862, cols. 122 7)
DW Williams showed that Parliament had no control over 
taxation and quoted Harcourt in 1892 that:
'Income tax questions are not in the hands oj the Government, but 
under the control of the IT Commissioners. '
This practice continued until 1950, when a chancellor refused 
to reply to a tax question (A Mere Matter of Machinery, DW 
Williams, LL.M, Bristol University, 1975). Thereafter, MPs, as 
the taxpayers' watchdog, took up complaint questions with the 
department until the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 
provided the countervailing power against an obdurate 
department, which would now have to face a:
'written complaint to a member of the House of Commons [on the 
grounds of] injustice from maladministration.' (s. 5(1 )(a))
From the outset maladministration was defined as: 'bias, 
neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, 
turpitude, arbitrariness, and so on' (734 HC Deb 5s 1966-67 
cols. 42 43. The Revenue has tried to minimise these criteria 
under the headings of 'Mistakes', 'Delays' and 'Serious or 
persistent errors' (Code of Practice 1). But a complaint to an MP 
for the Ombudsman should include the parliamentary 
definitions. A Select Committee was also ordered in November 
1967 'to examine reports laid before this House by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration' (HC 258 XIV 
289). A consequence was that, for the first time, complaints 
against the Revenue could at last be brought to the floor of the 
House. But an immediate problem was to force the Revenue t 
pay the compensation authorised by the Treasury Minute of 31 
December 1897 on grounds of 'equity or compassion'. In 1969 
the Revenue were shown to have claimed that an apology 'is 
sufficient remedy for maladministration' (HC 385, XIV, 383).
Others did not think so and in 1974 the Revenue were 
persisting in refusing to recompense claimants' costs in
rebutting false allegations. The Chairman of the Select 
committee told the Revenue to look at the matter again as 'we 
are all rather disturbed about this matter' (HC 454, XXX, 1, q. 
49 50). The Revenue did and finally agreed to pay the 
compensation in a letter of the 16 June 1975 (1974 75 Cmnd 
6144, para. 4). However the letter was not published to tax 
districts and was not discovered by the writer until 1992, but 
was finally acknowledged in 1994 in the Code of Practice 1 , with 
the words 'You may be able to claim back your expenses.' 
However, in 1999, compensation from a successful claim to the 
Adjudicator is still being resisted in regard to a taxpayer's 
compliance costs.
Complaints against the Revenue escalated to a peak in 1979, 
and widespread grievances by taxpayers required a simpler and 
easier access for a complainant. In consequence a Revenue 
Adjudicator was appointed to act as an 'impartial referee where 
people feel they have been badly treated by the Revenue' (press 
release, 17 February 1993). It was fully justified, as the 
Adjudicator received 2581 complaints in the first year to 31 
March 1995, compared to the Ombudsman's 85 in 1967, from 
a more articulate public.
However, complainants to the Ombudsman or Adjudicator 
both require a tenacity of purpose with a motivation to succeed 
in order to overcome the Revenue's procedural obstacles to the 
officer in charge of a district, and then to the Regionalo ' o
Controller. One district's excuse for delaying a claim was that it 
'would open a floodgate' of other claims, the justification of the 
claim was ignored. Other claims require months of firm 
responses tot he Revenue's blandishments before reaching 
either goal. But the advantage of the Adjudicator is the simpler 
criterion of having been 'badly treated by the Revenue' and not 
having to prove 'injustice through maladministration' to the 
Ombudsman. A claim can also be made, after the Adjudicator's 
findings, to the Ombudsman, if injustice has been proved. In 
both cases compensation for the costs of compliance with the 
tax laws can be made.
A more recent and extreme case of a complainant was proved 
by the findings of a Special Commissioner's decision in 1996 that 
a district inspector had 'wished to get his own back on the 
taxpayer's accountant who had complained' and that 'the 
Revenue had acted wholly unreasonably in connection with the 
hearing, having shown bad faith' (SpC Scott 8^ Anor v McDonald 
[1996] STC (SCD) 381). With substantial compensation this was 
a salutary outcome and endorses the view that the Revenue simply 
do not meet the criteria that the collection of revenues is being 
managed with 'care', as required by statute, and with conviction.
CONCLUSION
The writer has portrayed a bleak taxation record from the 
Board's creation in 1849, but with present taxing statutes 
originating in the 1803, 1842 and 1853 Taxing Acts, still 
without codification, another analysis in 1999 is impossible. The 
evidence provided for earlier Parliamentary Committees and 
Commissions was a vital analytic tool.
The present day Revenue's annual reports are disappointing. 
In 1962 Professor RM Titmus noted that the Board's 
comprehensive statistics ceased after 1918 and that, without 
criteria for deciding the unit of taxation for the family or 
individual, were of little further value (Income Distribution and
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Social Change,, Unwin University Books, p. 67). Today the 
transient hydra of Treasury commissioners, responsible for the 
direction of the Revenue, but without formal meetings 
recording decisions, and no harmony between First Lords of the 
Treasury and Chancellors, have little possibility ot forming 
cohesive taxation policies. Into this political vacuum the 
Revenue have injected their own policies, but   as with the 
issues raised of accountability, caring, codification, managementy o' o 
and reforms   without direction, have not been able to meet
those high standards which taxpayers have a right to expect.
In 1861 JS Mill wrote that the office of a 'representative 
assembly is to watch and control the government' (Representative
Government, ed RB McCallum, Basil Blackwell, (1949) at p. 172). 
This writer suggests that the greater need in modern times is to 
watch and control the Treasury. ©
Dr John Booth
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Announcement
A NEW SCHEME FOR THE INSTITUTE
The University has recently ratified a new constitution for its School of Advanced Study, under which constituent 
institutes are required to revise their Schemes in accordance with a new model format. As a result the new Scheme of 
the Institute shows a number of significant changes from the previous version, the most important of which are as follows.
1. All institute Boards are to be re-named Advisory Councils, and their terms of reference revised, in order to more 
accurately reflect the advisory nature of their responsibilities. In practical terms, however, there will be little change 
as far as the Institute is concerned as its Board has operated on this basis since 1989, whereas in some other institutes 
Boards have hitherto tended to exercise quasi-managerial functions.
2. The Institute has inserted the new formulation of its objectives as recommended by the Report of the IALS Review 
Committee.
3. The University has required the size of the new Advisory Councils to be significantly reduced as the old Boards were 
seen as being too unwieldy to exercise the functions now required of them. As a result the total maximum 
membership of the Institute's Advisory Council is being reduced from 41 to 26 (inclusive of ex-officio appointments 
and co-opted members) although it has still been possible to retain representation from all the academic and 
professional constituencies served by the Institute. A reduction in membership was also a significant 
recommendation of the Report of the IALS Review Committee. At its November meeting, the Council agreed that 
all current appointments, except for that of the Chairman, would terminate, and the Council will be re-constituted 
according to the new provisions.
4. The new Scheme provides for revised arrangements for the appointment of the Director, in accordance with a new 
protocol applicable across the School, which gives a greater degree of discretion in the process to the Vice-Chancellor 
of the University.
5. The Institute has taken the opportunity of the revision of its Scheme to include its own provision for the appointment 
of a Deputy Chairman, and it is envisaged that the holder of this new post will also chair the Development and 
Advisory Committee. This dual role will be a crucial one during the next few years in the context of the Institute's 
fund raising initiatives.
The new Scheme of the Institute was discussed and approved by the Advisory Council at its November 1999 meeting 
and has now been forwarded to the Board of the School (as the Curators have been re-named) for formal ratification. 
Copies of the Scheme may be obtained from me.
David Phillips
Administrative Secretary, IALS
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